ARNOLD (DO NOT DELETE)

5/20/2019 10:19 AM

Standing in the Line of Fire: Compulsory Campus
Carry Laws and Hostile Speech Environments
Cameron W. Arnold
I.INTRODUCTION ............................................................................... 808
II.COMPULSORY CAMPUS CARRY LAWS, GLASS V. PAXTON, AND THE
PROBLEM OF STANDING......................................................... 812
A. Campus Carry in the United States................................. 812
B. Glass v. Paxton ............................................................... 813
1. Texas’s Campus Carry Law and the University of
Texas’s Campus Carry Policy................................... 813
2. The Lawsuit .............................................................. 815
3. The District Court Decisions .................................... 818
4. The Fifth Circuit Appeal ........................................... 820
III.STANDING PROBLEMS IN COMPULSORY CAMPUS CARRY LAW
CASES ..................................................................................... 824
A. Standing in Cases Involving “Probabilistic” First
Amendment Injuries ....................................................... 825
1. Laird v. Tatum .......................................................... 826
2. Meese v. Keene ......................................................... 827
3. Clapper v. Amnesty International USA..................... 828
B. Misapplication of the Supreme Court’s “Probabilistic” First
Amendment Injury Jurisprudence to Compulsory Campus
Carry Law Cases............................................................. 829
IV.THE HOSTILE SPEECH ENVIRONMENT ......................................... 834
A. Evolution of the Title VII Hostile Work Environment
Framework ...................................................................... 834
B. From the Hostile Work Environment to the Hostile Speech
Environment ................................................................... 839
V.COMPULSORY CAMPUS CARRY LAWS AND THE HOSTILE SPEECH
ENVIRONMENT ....................................................................... 840
A. Defining a Hostile Speech Environment Standard ......... 840
 Assistant Professor of Legal Writing, Brooklyn Law School. I wish to thank my wife,
Danielle, and my sons, Maximilian and Gustavo, for all their love and support. I also wish to
thank Brooklyn Law School for supporting this Article with a Summer Research Stipend, the
BLS Legal Writing faculty, especially Professors Joy Kanwar and Maria Termini, and my
research assistants, Stephanie Coughlan, Tyler Gratton, and Michael Thorn.

807

ARNOLD (DO NOT DELETE)

808

5/20/2019 10:19 AM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:807

B. Applying the Hostile Speech Environment Framework in
Compulsory Campus Carry Law Cases .......................... 841
VI.CONCLUSION ............................................................................... 846
I.

INTRODUCTION

A first-year law student sits in her Constitutional Law class, listening
intently but nervously. All semester, the student’s professor has encouraged
active class participation, and the student has been quick to raise her hand,
engage with the class, and offer her views on the topic at hand. Today, the
class is discussing Supreme Court jurisprudence on reproductive rights. The
student has strong views on the issue, and she has always been outspoken
about those views. But this time, she feels great trepidation about speaking
up. The discussion is getting heated, and her law school is in a state that has
enacted a “compulsory campus carry law”1—a state law that requires public
colleges and universities to allow students with concealed carry permits to
carry firearms on campus, even in the classroom.2 Keenly aware that one or
more of her classmates could be armed, the student starts to raise her hand,
but then hesitates. Finally, she puts her hand down.
Critics of compulsory campus carry laws have noted that permitting
firearms in the classroom, as colleges and universities must do in states that
have enacted such laws, implicates the First Amendment by chilling
classroom speech.3 Unfortunately, as illustrated by the recent decision of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Glass v. Paxton,
plaintiffs challenging compulsory campus carry laws on First Amendment
grounds face a significant hurdle in establishing standing.4
1
See Shaundra K. Lewis, Crossfire on Compulsory Campus Carry Laws: When the
First and Second Amendments Collide, 102 IOWA L. REV. 2109, 2111 (2017) [hereinafter
Lewis, Crossfire].
2
See id.
3
See Aurora Temple Barnes, Guns and Academic Freedom, 53 GONZ. L. REV. 45, 48
(2017); Shaundra K. Lewis, Bullets and Books by Legislative Fiat: Why Academic Freedom
and Public Policy Permit Higher Education Institutions to Say No to Guns, 48 IDAHO L. REV.
1, 4 (2011) [hereinafter Lewis, Bullets and Books]; Shaundra K. Lewis & Daniel Alejandro
De Luna, Symposium on “Texas Gun Law and the Future”: The Fatal Flaws in Texas’s
Campus Carry Law, 41 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 135, 136 (2016); Laura Houser Oblinger, Note,
The Wild, Wild West of Higher Education: Keeping the Campus Carry Decision in the
University’s Holster, 53 WASHBURN L.J. 87, 89 (2013); Christopher M. Wolcott, Comment,
The Chilling Effect of Campus Carry: How the Kansas Campus Carry Statute Impermissibly
Infringes upon the Academic Freedom of Individual Professors and Faculty Members, 65 U.
KAN. L. REV. 875, 877 (2017); Kathy L. Wyer, Comment & Note, A Most Dangerous
Experiment? University Autonomy, Academic Freedom, and the Concealed-Weapons
Controversy at the University of Utah, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 983, 985 (2003); Lewis, Crossfire,
supra note 1, at 2111.
4
900 F.3d 233, 242 (5th Cir. 2018).
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In Glass, the Fifth Circuit upheld a district court decision dismissing in
its entirety a suit brought by three University of Texas at Austin (“UT”)
professors against the State of Texas and UT.5 In their complaint, the
professors challenged Texas’s compulsory campus carry law and UT’s
policies implementing that law.6 The professors alleged, among other things,
that requiring professors to allow students to carry firearms in the classroom
violated the professors’ First Amendment right to academic freedom.7
In upholding the district court’s dismissal of the professors’ complaint,
the Fifth Circuit rejected the professors’ First Amendment claims in part
because it concluded that the injury alleged by the professors was not
“certainly impending,” as required by the Supreme Court’s decision in
Clapper v. Amnesty International USA,8 and in part because it concluded that
the professors had failed to establish a direct causal connection between the
chilling of their speech and specific actions of state and university officials.9
According to the Fifth Circuit, because the professors independently “selfcensored” their speech out of fear of potential violence at the hands of
hypothetical armed and angry students, their First Amendment claims rested
on the speculative conduct of independent third parties.10

5
See Glass v. Paxton, No. 1:16-CV-845-LY, 2017 WL 4506806 (W.D. Tex. July 6,
2017), aff’d, 900 F.3d 233 (5th Cir. 2018).
6
Amended Complaint at 1–2, Glass v. Paxton, No. 1:16-CV-845-LY (W.D. Tex. July
6, 2017).
7
Id. at 11. This Article does not address the issues of whether, in cases challenging
compulsory campus carry laws, students or professors would make better plaintiffs, or
whether traditional free speech claims might fare better or worse than First Amendment
claims based on academic freedom. Academic freedom claims brought by professors raise
several unsettled issues: (1) uncertainty about whether the First Amendment creates a distinct
right to academic freedom; see, e.g., Urofsky v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401, 410 (4th Cir. 2000);
W. Stuart Stuller, High School Academic Freedom: The Evolution of a Fish Out of Water, 77
NEB. L. REV. 301, 302 (1998); Dahlia Lithwick & Richard C. Schragger, Jefferson v.
Cuccinelli: Does the Constitution Really Protect a Right to “Academic Freedom”?, SLATE
(June 1, 2010), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2010/06/jeffe
rson_v_cuccinelli.html. (2) uncertainty about whether, if it does, that right belongs to
individual faculty members or just academic institutions; see, e.g., Richard H. Hiers,
Institutional Academic Freedom vs. Faculty Academic Freedom in Public Colleges and
Universities: A Dubious Dichotomy, 29 J.C. & U.L. 35, 36 (2002); and (3) uncertainty about
the extent to which the First Amendment protects public university and college professors’
right to free speech, in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos, which
held that the First Amendment protects a public employee’s speech only if the employee
speaks “as a citizen” and not “pursuant to their official duties.” 547 U.S. 410, 417, 421 (2006);
see, e.g., Mark Strasser, Pickering, Garcetti, & Academic Freedom, 83 BROOK. L. REV. 579,
594 (2018). For a discussion of these issues in the campus carry context, see Lewis, Crossfire,
supra note 1, at 2117–29.
8
568 U.S. 398, 401 (2013).
9
See Glass, 900 F.3d at 238–42.
10
Id. at 242.
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This Article asserts that the argument against standing in cases where
plaintiffs challenge compulsory campus laws on First Amendment grounds
is based on a narrow and imprecise view of injury and causation, and a
misunderstanding of the plaintiffs’ allegations in these cases. Plaintiffs who
raise First Amendment challenges to compulsory campus carry laws do not
solely claim that their speech is chilled by a potential threat of future
violence; they also claim that the “mere presence,” or even potential
presence, of firearms in the classroom presently creates an environment
hostile to speech.11 Therefore, this Article proposes adopting a “hostile
speech environment” framework12 for purposes of analyzing injury and
causation in cases involving campus carry laws. The hostile speech
environment framework adapts a Title VII “hostile work environment”
framework to a First Amendment context.13 This framework would permit
plaintiffs to demonstrate that, although campus carry laws do not explicitly
prohibit speech on campus, when state and university officials enact or
implement such laws, they engage in conduct that is hostile toward
classroom speech in a manner “‘sufficiently severe or pervasive’ as to
reasonably affect [that] speech and create an environment objectively
11

See Barnes, supra note 3, at 79.
The presence of concealed carry weapons within the classroom directs
the content of the professor’s discourse away from controversial topics
that may be contrary to popular opinion. This aversion to provocative
content to preserve the safety of the class impedes the free inquiry of
scholarship, which is exactly what the doctrine of academic freedom was
created to prevent.
Id.; Lewis, Crossfire, supra note 1, at 2117, 2127 (“[S]tate legislation that compels concealed
carry of firearms on campus offends the post-secondary institutions’, the faculties’, and the
students’ First Amendment rights to academic freedom and free speech because the very
presence of firearms is likely to suppress freedom of thought and expression. . . . The
presence of guns inhibits students from freely exchanging ideas with each other.”); Lewis &
De Luna, supra note 3, at 139 (“[T]he mere presence of firearms has already affected the way
that some University of Houston professors teach.” (footnote omitted)); Oblinger, supra note
3, at 109 (“Even if a shot is never fired, a gun’s presence can still have the effect of
intimidation or suppression, which would inhibit healthy academic discourse.” (citing Joan
H. Miller, Comment, The Second Amendment Goes to College, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 235,
260 (2011))); see also Brief for Appellants at 15–16, 27, 34–35, Glass v. Paxton, 900 F.3d
233 (5th Cir. 2018) (No. 17-50641), 2017 WL 5665494 at *15–16,*27, *34–35 [hereinafter
Appellants’ Brief]; Reply Brief for Appellants at 4, 7–8, Glass v. Paxton, 900 F.3d 233 (5th
Cir. 2018) (No. 17-50641), 2018 WL 841882, at *4, *7–8 [hereinafter Reply Brief];
Supplemental Brief for Appellants at 14, Glass v. Paxton, 900 F.3d 233 (5th Cir. 2018) (No.
17-50641), 2018 WL 3634819, at *14 [hereinafter Supplemental Brief]; Brief for American
Association of University Professors, Giffords Law Center to Prevent Gun Violence, and
Brady Center to Prevent Gun Violence as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs-Appellants at
5–6, 12, 17, 23, Glass v. Paxton, 900 F.3d 233 (5th Cir. 2018) (No. 17-50641), 2017 WL
6506802, at *5–6, *12, *17, *23 [hereinafter AAUP Amicus Brief].
12
This framework was first proposed in another context in S. Cagle Juhan, Note, Free
Speech, Hate Speech, and the Hostile Speech Environment, 98 VA. L. REV. 1577, 1580 (2012).
13
See id. at 1579.
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abusive towards that speech.”14 The hostile environment itself is a present
injury causally connected to the conduct of state and university officials.
Part II of this Article chronicles the history of the litigation in Glass and
explores the nature of the allegations raised in that case. Part III discusses
the current standing framework applied by the Supreme Court in cases
involving “probabilistic” First Amendment injuries—injuries based on
possible, but not certain, “future threats.”15 This Part first discusses the
development of that framework. It then argues that this framework is illsuited for cases involving First Amendment challenges to compulsory
campus carry laws because the injury alleged in compulsory campus carry
cases is an environment that presently chills speech, rather than a chilling
caused by fear of future harm.
Part IV of this Article recommends adopting the hostile speech
environment framework in cases involving First Amendment challenges to
compulsory campus carry laws. First, it traces the evolution of the hostile
work environment framework, from its origins in the Fifth Circuit’s decision
in Rogers v. EEOC,16 to its incorporation by the Equal Employment
Commission (EEOC) into EEOC guidelines, and, finally, to its adoption by
the Supreme Court in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson17 and refinement
in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.18 Second, it addresses the origins and
philosophical underpinnings of the hostile speech environment framework,
which incorporates “terminology from Title VII’s ‘hostile work
environment’ framework” to address First Amendment issues involving
campus speech.19
Part V of this Article explains how the hostile speech environment
cause of action would apply in the context of campus carry laws. First, it
defines a hostile speech environment standard. Then, it explains how First
Amendment challenges to compulsory campus carry laws and policies can
be understood as arguments that these laws create an environment that is
hostile toward classroom speech in a manner “‘sufficiently severe or
pervasive’ as to reasonably affect [classroom] speech and create an
14
Id. at 1601 (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993); Meritor Sav.
Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986)).
15
See F. Andrew Hessick, Probabilistic Standing, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 55, 57 (2012)
(“Threatened future injuries are probabilistic; they might not occur.”); see also Andrew C.
Sand, Note, Standing Uncertainty: An Expected-Value Standard for Fear-Based Injury in
Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, 113 MICH. L. REV. 711, 713 (2015) (“Probabilistic
injury refers to any injury where it is uncertain that the underlying injury will actually
occur . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
16
454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971), disapproved by EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54
(1984).
17
477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986).
18
510 U.S. 17, 22–23 (1993).
19
See Juhan, supra note 12, at 1579.
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environment objectively abusive towards that speech.”20
II. COMPULSORY CAMPUS CARRY LAWS, GLASS V. PAXTON, AND THE
PROBLEM OF STANDING
A. Campus Carry in the United States
The term “campus carry laws” refers broadly to state statutes and
regulations governing the carrying of firearms by students, faculty members,
staff members, and visitors on the premises of state public institutions of
higher education.21 “Compulsory campus carry laws” are state laws that
require institutions of higher education to allow on their premises the
carrying of firearms by, at the very least, students and faculty members.22
Residents of all fifty states may carry concealed firearms in some
locations in those states if “they meet certain state requirements.”23 The
following sixteen states have enacted “prohibitory campus carry laws,”24
which explicitly prohibit individuals from carrying concealed firearms on
the campuses of institutions of higher education: California, Florida, Illinois,
Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, South
Carolina, and Wyoming.25 The following twenty-three states either
explicitly or implicitly allow institutions of higher education to decide for
themselves whether to allow individuals to carry concealed firearms on their
campuses: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii,
Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Montana, New
Hampshire, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota,
Vermont, Virginia, Washington, and West Virginia.26

20
Id. at 1601 (first quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 21; and then quoting Meritor, 477 U.S.
at 65, 67).
21
See Lewis, Crossfire, supra note 1, at 2111.
22
See id.
23
Guns on Campus: Overview, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATORS (Aug. 14, 2018),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/education/guns-on-campus-overview.aspx.
24
Lewis, Crossfire, supra note 1, at 2113.
25
See CAL. PENAL CODE § 626.9(h) (West 2018); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.06(12)(a), (13)
(West 2017); 430 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 66 / 65(a)(15) (West 2015); LA. STAT. ANN. §
14:95(A)(5)(a) (2018); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 269, § 10(j) (West 2015); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 28.425o(1)(h) (West 2017); MO. ANN. STAT. § 571.107(1)(10) (West 2014);
NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-1204.04(1) (West 2018); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 202.265(1)(e)
(West 2015); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:39-5(e)(1) (West 2013); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-7-2.4(A)
(West 2018); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.01-a (McKinney 2016); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14269.2(b) (West 2015); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 62.1-02-13(1) (West 2015); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 16-23-420(A) (2018); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-8-104(t)(x) (West 2018); see also Lewis,
Crossfire, supra note 1, at 2113; Guns on Campus, supra note 23.
26
See Lewis, Crossfire, supra note 1, at 2116; Guns on Campus, supra note 23.
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The following ten states have enacted laws allowing concealed-carry
permit holders to carry firearms on the campuses of institutions of higher
education: Arkansas, Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas, Mississippi,
Oregon, Texas, Utah, and Wisconsin.27 The following six states have
enacted “compulsory campus carry laws,” which “limit the discretion of
higher education institutions to decide whether to ban guns inside academic
buildings[:] . . . Colorado, Idaho, Tennessee, Texas, and Wisconsin.”28
Tennessee law permits the carrying of firearms on campuses of institutions
of higher learning by faculty members who are licensed to carry them, “but
the law does not extend to students or the general public.”29 Nationally, the
trend has been toward permitting more concealed firearms on college and
university campuses.30
B. Glass v. Paxton
1. Texas’s Campus Carry Law and the University of Texas’s
Campus Carry Policy
To date, the most significant legal challenge to a state campus carry law
has been Glass v. Paxton,31 in which three professors at UT challenged
Texas’s campus carry law and UT’s policies implementing that law. Texas’s
campus carry law, passed as Senate Bill 1132 and codified into law in section
411.2031 of the Texas Government Code,33 went into effect on August 16,
2016.34 The statute allows a handgun “license holder”35 to “carry a
27
See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-73-322(b)–(c) (West 2016); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1812-214(1)(a) (West 2016); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-127.1 (West 2016); IDAHO CODE ANN. §
18-3309(1)–(2) (West 2016); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 75-7c20(a) (West 2015); MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 97-37-17(6)(c) (West 2011); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 166.370(3)(j) (West 2015); TEX. GOV’T
CODE ANN. § 411.2031(c) (West 2016); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-505.5(2) (West 2015);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 941.23(2)(d) (West 2016); Guns on Campus, supra note 23; Lewis,
Crossfire, supra note 1, at 2116–17.
28
Lewis, Crossfire, supra note 1, at 2114–15.
29
Guns on Campus, supra note 23.
30
See id. (noting that “[i]n 2013, at least 19 states introduced legislation to allow
concealed carry on campus in some regard and in the 2014 legislative session, at least 14
states introduced similar legislation” and that, since 2015, three states (Arkansas, Georgia,
and Texas) have “passed legislation to allow students and faculty to carry guns on college
campuses” and one state (Ohio) passed legislation “lift[ing] [a] ban on firearms on college
campuses and leav[ing] the decision to individual institutions”); see also Lewis, Crossfire,
supra note 1, at 2113–17.
31
900 F.3d 233 (5th Cir. 2018).
32
S.B. 11, 84th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2015).
33
TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 411.2031 (West 2018).
34
See Glass v. Paxton, No. 1:16-CV-845-LY, 2017 WL 4506806, at *1 (W.D. Tex. July
6, 2017).
35
TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 411.171–.209 (providing for the licensing of handguns in
Texas).
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concealed handgun on or about the license holder’s person while the license
holder is on the campus of an institution of higher education.”36 It prohibits
institutions of higher education from adopting policies that would bar
“license holders from carrying handguns on the campus of the institution[s],”
except as provided for in the statute.37
The statute requires a university or college president, or other
equivalent officer, to “establish reasonable rules, regulations, or other
provisions” for implementing and executing the campus carry law.38 Before
establishing such rules and regulations, however, the president or an
equivalent officer must first “consult[] with students, staff, and faculty of the
institution regarding the nature of the student population, specific safety
considerations, and the uniqueness of the campus environment.”39
The statute permits amendments to the relevant university policies by
the president or an equivalent officer, “as necessary for campus safety.”40 It
further allows the university’s or college’s “governing board” to amend the
policies “wholly or partly.”41 It does not, however, allow the university or
college to establish any policies that would “generally prohibit or have the
effect of generally prohibiting license holders from carrying concealed
handguns on [campus].”42 In an advisory opinion, the Attorney General of
Texas interpreted this language as prohibiting any provision that would bar,
or allow individual professors to bar, students from carrying firearms in
university or college classrooms.43
After the state enacted the campus carry law, UT formed a working
group made up of members of the campus community.44 The group included
“students, alumni, staff, and faculty.”45 The working group’s job was to
recommend university policies that implemented and executed the law.46
Prior to making its recommendations, the working group considered
“thousands of comments from the public.”47 Many commenters expressed
serious concerns that the presence or potential presence of firearms in the
36

Id. § 411.2031(b).
Id. § 411.2031(c).
38
Id. § 411.2031(d-1).
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 411.2031(d-2).
42
TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 411.2031(d-1) (West 2016).
43
Tex. Attorney Gen., Opinion Letter on Authority of an Institution of Higher Education
to Establish Certain Rules Regarding the Carrying of Handguns on Campus, Op. No. KP0051 (Dec. 21, 2015), https://www2.texasattorneygeneral.gov/opinions/opinions/51paxton/o
p/2015/kp0051.pdf.
44
See Glass v. Paxton, 900 F.3d 233, 236 (5th Cir. 2018).
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Id.
37
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classroom would chill classroom discussions.48
The working group issued a final report, which recommended policies
and procedures to UT’s president.49 The report contained summaries of
stakeholders’ comments both for and against permitting students to carry
concealed firearms inside classrooms.50 Although the working group
sympathized “with the concerns about chilled speech,” it “recommended
against banning concealed carry inside classrooms because [it believed that]
such a regulation would likely violate the campus carry law by effectively
prohibiting concealed carry for those traveling to campus to attend class.”51
UT’s president ultimately “accepted the recommendations,”52 and UT’s
Board of Regents “incorporated all . . . of the President’s new policies into
the University’s operating procedures,”53 with the exception of one
procedure “that prohibited license holders from keeping a live-round loaded
in the chamber of their handguns while on campus.”54
2. The Lawsuit
On July 6, 2016, three UT professors, Dr. Jennifer Lynn Glass, Dr. Lisa
Moore, and Dr. Mia Carter, filed a complaint in the United States District
Court for the Western District of Texas against UT and the State of Texas.55
The professors alleged, among other things, that Texas’s compulsory campus
carry law and UT’s policies implementing that law violated the First
Amendment.56 According to the professors, “[c]ompelling professors at a
public university to allow, without any limitation or restriction, students to
carry concealed guns in their classrooms chills their First Amendment rights
to academic freedom.”57
The professors based their First Amendment cause of action on the
premise that the presence of firearms in the classroom would chill classroom
speech.58 The professors contended that

48

Id. at 236–37. Supporters of the law, however, “countered that such fears [we]re
unfounded, citing data ‘from the Texas Department of Public Safety establishing that license
holders, as a group, are extremely law-abiding.’” Id. at 237.
49
Id. at 236.
50
Glass, 900 F.3d at 236–37.
51
Id. at 237.
52
Id. at 236.
53
Id. at 237.
54
Id. at 237 n.1.
55
See generally Complaint, Glass v. Paxton, No. 1:16-CV-845-LY (W.D. Tex. July 6,
2017). The professors subsequently filed an amended complaint on August 9, 2016. See
generally Amended Complaint, supra note 6.
56
Amended Complaint, supra note 6, at 11–15, 17–18.
57
Id. at 11.
58
Id. at 11–15.

ARNOLD (DO NOT DELETE)

816

5/20/2019 10:19 AM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:807

robust academic debate in the classroom inevitably will be
dampened to some degree by the fear that it could expose other
students or themselves to gun violence by the professor’s
awareness that one or more students has one or more handguns
hidden but at the ready if the gun owner is moved to anger and
impulsive action.59
Referring to academic studies on the behavioral effects of individuals’
proximity to firearms, the professors argued that the hidden presence of
handguns in the classroom would chill the speech of students carrying
firearms and students who were in close proximity to those carrying
firearms.60 The professors sought, among other things, a declaratory
judgment that Texas’s compulsory campus carry law and UT’s policies
implementing the law were unconstitutional, as well as preliminary and
permanent injunctions prohibiting the implementation of the law and its
attendant policies.61
In their complaint, each of the three professors individually illustrated
the potential chilling effect the presence of firearms would have in their
classrooms.62 Each also expressed their own specific concerns about “[their]
safety, and the safety of [their] students, as a result of the current concealed
carry rules and [their] inability to bar concealed carry in [the] classroom.”63
Professor Glass stated that she typically sought to “generate debate” in
her courses, including one “on fertility and reproduction which include[d]
classroom discussion on such currently volatile topics as abortion and
unwanted pregnancies.”64 She maintained, however, that “[t]he possible
presence of hidden weapons that can quickly deal death threaten[ed] to chill
[her] manner of teaching.”65 To illustrate her point, Professor Glass
described an incident “in her own classroom” in which “a verbally
aggressive student, disappointed in a grade handed out during class,
display[ed] a level of animosity and aggressiveness toward [her] teaching
assistant.”66 According to Professor Glass, “had the current concealed carry
rule been in place, [it] would have left her hesitant to confront the student in
defense of her teaching assistant and urge a reasoned discussion of the matter
at hand.”67

59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67

Id. at 12.
Id. at 12–13.
Id. at 19–20.
Amended Complaint, supra note 6, at 13–15.
Id. at 13.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 13–14.
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Professor Moore, who taught a class entitled “LGBT Literature and
Culture,” asserted that “[p]rejudices against those who are part of the LGBT
community has sometimes made the class a target of hate.”68 To illustrate
her point, Professor Moore described incidents involving two students.69
The first student “announced on the first day of class that she was enrolled
to monitor and report on Professor Moore’s ‘homosexual agenda.’”70 The
second student made “increasingly troubling statements, and [took]
personally intrusive steps, toward the professor and his co-students, to the
point that seemed personally threatening.”71 Professor Moore maintained
that these incidents “dampened” classroom discussion, participation, and
debate.72 She further stated that some students even dropped her class as a
result of the second student’s conduct.73 According to Professor Moore, the
“possibility of guns in the classroom would only have exacerbated the
deleterious effect on academic discussion and freedom for those in the
class.”74
Professor Carter described her “courses in modern and contemporary
cultures, both of which include[d] controversial topics such as imperialism
and power structures related to sexuality and gender.”75 In these courses,
Professor Carter employed a “pedagogic approach [that] emphasize[d]
dialogue and debate and the critical examination of one’s own ideas and
others’ beliefs.”76 According to Professor Carter, “[e]ngendering a
community of trust is crucial for the classroom to work as it should.”77
Therefore, “[t]he potential of having a student carrying a weapon in the
classroom would jeopardize the community of trust and be destructive to the
dynamic educational process.”78
Professor Carter also maintained that “[f]urther exacerbating this
situation would be the presence of students with mental health issues, a
situation that the professor ha[d] encountered in the past.”79 According to
Professor Carter, who claimed that she and her students had been threatened
in the past, “[a]ll this would be made even worse were guns allowed into the
classroom, with the consequence that classroom debate would be chilled to
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79

Amended Complaint, supra note 6, at 14.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Amended Complaint, supra note 6, at 14.
Id. at 14–15.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 15.
Id.
Id.
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a greater degree.”80
In support of their argument that “the hidden presence of handguns”
exacerbates the “problem of squelched academic debate and discussion,” the
professors referred to “peer-reviewed academic studies” about the “weapons
effect.”81 The professors maintained that “[t]hese academic studies show
that the presence of handguns changes people’s behavior.”82 More
specifically, “[t]hose who are already agitated will behave more aggressively
if they[] see, talk about, handle[,] or even think about a nearby gun.”83
According to the professors, “the behavioral effect of being near a weapon
applies not only to the person in possession of the gun but also to other
classmates if they are aware that some other student in the class is armed.”84
3. The District Court Decisions
On August 22, 2016, the district court denied the professors’ motion for
a preliminary injunction.85 Because of the procedural posture of the case,
the district court’s decision reached “only [the professors’] request for
immediate relief and ma[de] no final ruling on any asserted issue.”86
Nevertheless, the district court based its ruling in part on its conclusion that
the professors had “failed to establish a substantial likelihood of ultimate
success on the merits” on any of their claims.87
In addressing the professors’ First Amendment claim, the district court
focused largely on what it perceived to be the professors’ failure to establish
a causal connection between the chilling of their speech, and the conduct of
state and university officials.88 According to the district court, even if the
facts alleged in the professors’ complaint were true, they were insufficient to
establish a First Amendment violation because the professors had censored
their speech out of fear of being shot by some hypothetical armed and angry
student, and not because the state or the university had prohibited the
professors from speaking.89
The district court stated that “[t]he burden of which [the professors]
complain[ed] . . . [did] not fit within any recognized right of academic
freedom,” because “neither the Campus Carry Law nor the Campus Carry
80
81
82
83
84
85

Amended Complaint, supra note 6, at 15.
Id. at 12–13.
Id. at 13.
Id.
Id.
Glass v. Paxton, No. 1:16-CV-845-LY, 2016 WL 8904948, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 22,

2016).
86
87
88
89

Id.
Id. at *6.
Id. at *4–6.
Id.
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Policy [wa]s a content-based regulation of speech, nor c[ould] either
reasonably be construed as a direct regulation of speech.”90 The district court
further contended that Texas’s campus carry law and UT’s policy did “not
direct [the professors] either toward or away from any particular subject or
point of view” or forbid them from “speak[ing] and teach[ing] freely.”91
On July 6, 2017, the district court granted the State of Texas’s and UT’s
various motions to dismiss the professors’ Amended Complaint in its
entirety.92 The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, ruling that the professors lacked standing under Article
III.93 In so ruling, the district court relied in part, on the Supreme Court’s
decisions in Laird v. Tatum94 and Clapper v. Amnesty International USA,95
both of which involved allegations of First Amendment chill. The district
court concluded not only that the professors had failed to establish an injuryin-fact but that they also failed to demonstrate “that [their] alleged injury
[wa]s traceable to any conduct of Defendants.”96 In particular, the district
court concluded that the professors failed to establish that the chilling of their
speech was “fairly traceable to the Campus Carry Law and Campus Carry
Policy.”97
The district court noted that the Supreme Court had been “reluctan[t] to
endorse standing theories that rest on speculation about the decisions of
independent actors.”98 The district court characterized the basis of the
professors’ First Amendment claim as a “self-imposed censoring of
classroom discussions caused by their fear of the possibility of illegal activity
by persons not joined in this lawsuit.”99 According to the district court, the
professors presented “no concrete evidence to substantiate their fears, but
instead rest[ed] on ‘mere conjecture about possible . . . actions.’”100
90

Id. at *3–4 (citing Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 188 (1990)) (stating that the
district court “ha[d] found no precedent for Plaintiffs’ proposition that there is a right of
academic freedom so broad that it allows them such autonomous control of their classrooms—
both physically and academically—that their concerns override decisions of the legislature
and the governing body of the institution that employs them”).
91
Glass, 2016 WL 8904948, at *4 (citing Univ. of Pa., 493 U.S. at 198).
92
Glass v. Paxton, No. 1:16-CV-845-LY, 2017 WL 4506806, at *1 (W.D. Tex. July 6,
2017), aff’d, 900 F.3d 233 (5th Cir. 2018).
93
Id. at *3.
94
408 U.S. 1 (1972).
95
568 U.S. 398 (2013).
96
Glass, 2017 WL 4506806, at *3 (citing Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl.
Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180–81 (2000)).
97
Id.
98
Id. (quoting Clapper, 568 U.S. at 414); see also Clapper, 568 U.S. at 413 (“In the past,
we have been reluctant to endorse standing theories that require guesswork as to how
independent decisionmakers will exercise their judgment.”).
99
Id.
100
Id. (quoting Clapper, 568 U.S. at 420).
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The district court further maintained that the professors neither
“challenge[d] a direct regulation or restriction on speech,” specified “a
subject matter or point of view they feel they must eschew as a result of the
Campus Carry Law and Campus Carry Policy,” nor pointed “to a specific
harm they ha[d] suffered or w[ould] suffer as a result of the law and
policy.”101 Instead, the court contended, the professors pointed only to an
alleged “chilling effect” that “appear[ed] to arise from [the professors’]
subjective belief that a person may be more likely to cause harm to a
professor or student as a result of the law and policy.”102
4. The Fifth Circuit Appeal
The professors appealed the decision of the district court to the Fifth
Circuit.103 In their briefs, the professors and Amici clarified that the
professors’ First Amendment claims were not based solely on the allegation
that fear of violent reprisals from armed students caused the professors to
self-censor.104 Instead, the professors also alleged that the presence of
firearms in the classroom created an environment of intimidation that itself
chilled speech.105
The professors argued that Texas’s compulsory Campus Carry Law and
the university’s policy implementing that law “creat[ed] an unavoidable
pressure pushing against exploration of matters that are of the moment
controversial” and “ha[d] the effect of lessening the vigor and extent of the
ideas explored in college classroom teaching.”106 According to the
professors, the mere knowledge that their classmates might be carrying guns
would cause faculty and students to refrain from addressing controversial

101

Id.
Glass, 2017 WL 4506806, at *3.
103
See Glass v. Paxton, 900 F.3d 233 (5th Cir. 2018).
104
See Reply Brief, supra note 11, at 4 (chiding the district court for reducing the
professors’ “specific allegations about the inter-relation of academic pedagogy, hidden
weaponry they could not keep from their classrooms, and historic experience with the great
human damage done by guns in the hands of college students to being nothing more than a
‘self-imposed censoring of classroom discussions’ caused by fear”); Supplemental Brief,
supra note 11, at 14 (“It is not their (or their students) being shot or having a gun waived in
their face that is the immediate concern in terms of classroom pedagogy and method. It is the
context, both immediate and historical, that affects their conduct of the classroom.”); AAUP
Amicus Brief, supra note 11, at 12 (“Plaintiffs allege (and social science confirms) that the
presence of guns—even if not flourished or discharged—can significantly alter the dynamics
of provocative exchanges.”); see also id. at 17 (“The alleged chill does not depend on
uncertain third-party actions, such as a student brandishing or firing a handgun . . . .”).
105
See Appellants’ Brief, supra note 11, at 15–16, 27, 34–35; Reply Brief, supra note 11,
at 4, 7–8; Supplemental Brief, supra note 11, at 14; AAUP Amicus Brief, supra note 11, at
5–6, 12, 17, 23.
106
Appellants’ Brief, supra note 11, at 27.
102
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topics.107 The professors chided the district court for
reduc[ing] their specific allegations about the inter-relation of
academic pedagogy, hidden weaponry they could not keep from
their classrooms, and historic experience with the great human
damage done by guns in the hands of college students to being
nothing more than a “self-imposed censoring of classroom
discussions” caused by fear.108
They maintained that “[i]t is not [the professors’] (or their students) being
shot or having a gun waived in their face that is the immediate concern in
terms of classroom pedagogy and method. It is the context, both immediate
and historical, that affects their conduct of the classroom.”109
The professors challenged the notion that the alleged injury was
speculative or based on some fear of future injury. They maintained that
they did “not assert[] that sometime in the future they may decide that they
need to curtail their classroom teaching activities because of [the]
implementation [of Texas’s campus carry law] at [UT].”110 Instead, they
were asserting that the law’s “implementation w[ould] affect them presently,
leading them to dampen the kind of intellectual inquiry that they normally
engage in with their students in class.”111 According to the professors, “from
the beginning of guns-in-the-classroom, academic activities will be
adversely affected.”112 Finally, the professors connected the chilling of their
speech to the conduct of state and university officials, maintaining that
the facts at this stage of the case point to a direct link between the
challenged policy and the lessening of debate and discussion—a
shortening of the academic spectrum—in these professors’
classrooms. The intimidatory impact of an official policy that
prevents the exclusion of guns from their classrooms lessens First
Amendment activity in these three professors’ classrooms.113
The American Association of University Professors (“AAUP”), the
Giffords Law Center to Prevent Gun Violence, and the Brady Center to
Prevent Gun Violence (collectively, the “Amici”) jointly filed an amicus
brief in support of the professors.114 The Amici characterized the professors’
107

Id. at 16.
Reply Brief, supra note 11, at 4 (citation omitted).
109
Supplemental Brief, supra note 11, at 14.
110
Appellants’ Brief, supra note 11, at 34.
111
Id. at 34–35.
112
Id. at 35; see also Reply Brief, supra note 11, at 7–8 (“The guns-in-the-classroom
mandate is a concrete fact, in place since the fall semester of 2016. Its adverse impact occurred
from the moment the policy was forced into effect and imposed on these three professors in
particular to deny them any options to ban the guns from their classrooms that the state
officials have told them they must allow in with those students who wish to tote them.”).
113
Supplemental Brief, supra note 11, at 15.
114
See AAUP Amicus Brief, supra note 11, at 3–6.
108
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“core contention” as the proposition “that admitting handguns into
classrooms alters the educational environment,”115 and their alleged injury
as “chill arising from a necessary accommodation to the potential presence
of firearms in the classroom and students’ knowledge of that potential.”116
According to the Amici, the Professors’ “allegations articulate[d] a
widespread belief among educators that the presence of guns interferes with
pedagogy.”117
The Amici further argued that the Professors’ allegations could not
“reasonably be dismissed as ‘subjective fear,’”118 in part because they were
not based solely on fear of some future violent reprisal.119 According to the
Amici, the chill alleged by the Professors did “not depend on uncertain thirdparty actions, such as a student brandishing or firing a handgun.”120 Instead,
the professors alleged “(and social science confirm[ed]) that the presence of
guns—even if not flourished or discharged—can significantly alter the
dynamics of provocative exchanges.”121
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision that the
professors lacked standing on all claims.122 In affirming the district court’s
decision on the First Amendment cause of action, the Fifth Circuit, like the
district court before it, focused on a perceived lack of injury, and lack of a
causal connection between the chilling of the professors’ speech and the
conduct of state or university officials.123 Like the district court, the Fifth
Circuit relied on Laird and Clapper.124 Applying these cases, the Fifth
Circuit concluded that the professors “lacked standing because [they] alleged
a ‘subjective’ First Amendment chill that was contrary to the presumption
[their] students ‘will conduct their activities within the law and so avoid
prosecution and conviction.’”125
The Fifth Circuit asserted that whether the professors had “standing
[turned] on whether the alleged harm threatened by concealed-carrying
students [was] ‘certainly impending.’”126 The court concluded that the
115

Id. at 5.
Id. at 17–18.
117
Id. at 6.
118
Id. at 5.
119
Id. at 5, 12–13, 17.
120
AAUP Amicus Brief, supra note 11, at 17; see also id. at 23 (“Plaintiffs’ alleged chill
does not turn on a belief that, as the Attorney General flamboyantly put it in the court below,
‘adults who have been licensed to carry handguns could attack them at any moment if they
say anything potentially controversial in class.’”).
121
Id. at 12.
122
Glass v. Paxton, 900 F.3d 233, 236 (5th Cir. 2018).
123
Id. at 238–42.
124
Id.
125
Id. at 238 (quoting O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 497 (1974)).
126
Id. at 240.
116
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professors lacked standing because their “allegation[s] of harm involve[d] a
‘chain of contingencies’” and “[e]ach link in the chain of contingencies” was
not “certainly impending.”127
The Fifth Circuit characterized the professors’ alleged injury as
follows: the professors’ “fear of potential violent acts by firearm-carrying
students prompt[ed] [them] to self-censor by avoiding topics [they] worr[ied]
might incite such violence or intimidation, which would be unnecessary but
for the law and policy that prevent[ed] [them] from banning firearms in
[their] classroom[s].”128 The court concluded that “[u]ltimately, whether
concealed-carrying students pose certain harm to [the professors] turns on
their independent decision-making.”129
Therefore, “[b]ecause [the
professors] fail[ed] to allege certainty as to how these students w[ould]
exercise their future judgment, the alleged harm [wa]s not certainly
impending.”130
According to the court, the professors could not
“manufacture standing by self-censoring [their] speech based on what [they]
allege[d] to be a reasonable probability that concealed-carry license holders
w[ould] intimidate professors and students in the classroom.”131
The Fifth Circuit acknowledged that the professors had put forward
opinion evidence from “multiple University faculty members and multiple
national educational organizations” who “believe[d] that the presence of
guns in the classroom w[ould] chill professors’ speech,” and that the
Professors had even “cite[d] to various academic studies discussing a socalled ‘weapons effect,’” whereby “the hidden presence of guns does
threaten disruption of classroom activities, increases the likelihood that
violence will erupt in the classroom, and intimidates non-carrying students—
and undoubtedly professors, too.”132 The court, however, concluded “that
127

Id. at 239 (quoting Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 410–14 (2013)).
Glass, 900 F.3d at 240.
129
Id at 241.
130
Id.
131
Id. at 242.
132
Id. at 240. The Fifth Circuit was referring to the amicus brief filed by the Amici. See
generally AAUP Amicus Brief, supra note 11. In the brief, the Amici maintained that
“[s]tudies dating back to 1967 have demonstrated the ‘weapons effect’: the tendency of
provoked individuals to behave aggressively when in the presence of actual guns, pictures of
guns, and even words referring to weapons.” Id. at 21 (first citing Leonard Berkowitz &
Anthony LePage, Weapons as Aggression-Eliciting Stimuli, 7 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 202, 202 (1967); and then citing Arlin James Benjamin, Jr. & Brad J. Bushman, The
Weapons Effect, 19 CURRENT OPINION PSYCHOL. 93, 96 (2018)). According to the Amici, the
research both “suggests that carrying a concealed weapon can increase aggressive behavior
by the person carrying” and “demonstrates that words or pictures of guns exert a priming
effect on individuals—even if they themselves are not carrying guns—triggering the
accessibility of aggressive concepts. Id. at 21–22 (first citing David Hemenway et al., Is an
Armed Society a Polite Society? Guns and Road Rage, 38 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION
687, 687 (2006); and then citing Craig A. Anderson et al., Does the Gun Pull the Trigger?
128
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none of the cited evidence alleges a certainty that a license-holder will
illegally brandish a firearm in a classroom.”133
III. STANDING PROBLEMS IN COMPULSORY CAMPUS CARRY LAW CASES
As the Glass decisions demonstrate, plaintiffs seeking to challenge
compulsory campus carry laws face a significant hurdle: establishing, for
purposes of Article III standing, a causal connection between the chilling of
their speech and the conduct of state and university officials.134 The
professors’ claims failed in Glass because, in assessing injury and causation,
the district court and the Fifth Circuit applied a rigid application of the
current Supreme Court framework for analyzing Article III standing in cases
involving what some scholars have called “probabilistic” First Amendment
injuries—injuries based on possible, but not certain, “future threats.”135 As
discussed below, even assuming the courts in Glass correctly applied the
Supreme Court’s “probabilistic” First Amendment injury framework, the
framework is ill-suited for compulsory campus carry cases.
The
“probabilistic” First Amendment injury framework applies to cases in which
speech is chilled by a fear of future harm. In contrast, in campus carry cases,
the alleged chill is caused by a present injury: an “altered educational
environment” of fear and intimidation that itself chills speech.136

Automatic Priming Effects of Weapons Pictures and Weapon Names, 9 PSYCHOL. SCI. 308,
308 (1998)). The Amici concluded, “[i]n other words, the ‘mere presence of weapons’
magnifies both aggressive cognition and aggressive conduct—particularly in stressful
situations. And this heightened aggression afflicts both those who carry weapons and those
who perceive their mere presence.” Id. at 22.
133
Glass, 900 F.3d at 241.
134
See Barnes, supra note 3, at 83 (noting, prior to the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Glass,
that the plaintiffs in that case must establish “that the state law is closely related to the
infringement of their academic freedom,” and concluding that “[i]f the imposition on their
academic freedom is too ‘remote and attenuated’ from the state and university action, their
case will fail.” (quoting Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 200 (1990))).
135
See Hessick, supra note 15, at 57; Sand, supra note 15, at 713.
136
See AAUP Amicus Brief, supra note 11, at 5–6 (“Plaintiffs’ core contention [is] that
admitting handguns into classrooms alters the educational environment . . . . Plaintiffs’
allegations articulate a widespread belief among educators that the presence of guns interferes
with pedagogy, a belief confirmed by social science research demonstrating that the very
presence of guns can propel discomfort into overt aggression, even if no one threatens an
actual shooting.”); see also Barnes, supra note 3, at 83 (“[I]f the presence of guns creates an
‘atmosphere of suspicion and distrust’ within which ‘scholarship cannot flourish,’ academic
freedom has been infringed.” (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250
(1957))).
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A. Standing in Cases Involving “Probabilistic” First Amendment
Injuries
Federal courts apply a three-part test to determine whether a plaintiff
has standing under Article III.137 First, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the
plaintiff “suffered an ‘injury in fact’—an invasion of a legally protected
interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) ‘actual or imminent,
not “conjectural” or “hypothetical.”‘“138 Second, the plaintiff must establish
“a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of.”139
The injury must “be ‘fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the
defendant, and not . . . th[e] result [of] the independent action of some third
party not before the court.’”140 Finally, the plaintiff must show that it is
“‘likely,’ as opposed to merely ‘speculative,’ that the injury will be
‘redressed by a favorable decision.’”141
Frederick Shauer has defined a chilling injury as an injury that “occurs
when individuals seeking to engage in activity protected by the [F]irst
[A]mendment are deterred from so doing by governmental regulation not
specifically directed at that protected activity.”142 Although the government
regulation at issue may have only an “indirect effect on the exercise of First
Amendment rights,” to establish standing, plaintiffs alleging such injuries
must still establish that the regulation directly injured them.143
In assessing standing in Glass, both the Fifth Circuit and the district
court rigidly applied Supreme Court precedent involving “probabilistic”
First Amendment injuries.144 The court considered the following Supreme

137
See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 738 (1984), abrogated by Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v.
Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118 (2014) (holding that, to establish standing, “[a]
plaintiff must allege [1] personal injury [2] fairly traceable to the defendant’s allegedly
unlawful conduct and [3] likely to be redressed by the requested relief”).
138
Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (citation omitted) (quoting
Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990)) (first citing Allen, 468 U.S. at 756; then
citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 508 (1975); and then citing Sierra Club v. Morton, 405
U.S. 727, 740–41 n.16 (1972)).
139
Id. at 560.
140
Id. at 560–61 (quoting Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41–42
(1976)).
141
Id. at 561 (quoting Simon, 426 U.S. at 38, 43).
142
Frederick Shauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: Unraveling the “Chilling
Effect”, 58 B.U. L. REV. 685, 693 (1978); see also Jonathan R. Siegel, Note, Chilling Injuries
as a Basis for Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 905, 913 (1989) (“[G]overnment action that exerts only
a chilling effect on expression, by definition, does not directly and affirmatively prohibit it.”).
143
Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 12–13 (1972).
144
Glass v. Paxton, 900 F.3d 233, 238–42 (5th Cir. 2018); Glass v. Paxton, No. 1:16-CV845-LY, 2017 WL 4506806, at *2–3 (W.D. Tex. July 6, 2017), aff’d, 900 F.3d 233 (5th Cir.
2018).
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Court cases in its analysis: Laird v. Tatum,145 Meese v. Keene,146 and Clapper
v. Amnesty International USA.147
1. Laird v. Tatum
In Laird v. Tatum, the Supreme Court held that plaintiffs alleging a First
Amendment chill based on fear of a future injury could not establish standing
by alleging a mere “subjective ‘chill.’”148 There, the plaintiffs alleged that
their First Amendment rights were violated by a United States Army
program, in which Army intelligence collected data about civilian activities
deemed potentially disruptive.149 According to the plaintiffs, the program’s
“very existence” impermissibly chilled their speech.150
The Court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing because they could
not establish an injury that was fairly traceable to the Army’s conduct.151
The Court concluded that the plaintiffs’ allegations amounted to claims “of
a subjective ‘chill’” based on speculation about some undetermined future
harm.152 According to the Court, “[a]llegations of a subjective ‘chill’ are not
an adequate substitute for a claim of specific present objective harm or a
threat of specific future harm.”153
The Court acknowledged that its precedent supported the proposition
that laws and regulations that do not directly prohibit or restrict speech may
still violate the First Amendment by indirectly chilling speech.154 It
maintained, however, that none of its prior cases permitted standing based
on plaintiffs’ fear of some uncertain, hypothetical future government
action.155 The Court concluded that, to establish standing under its
145

408 U.S. 1 (1972).
481 U.S. 465 (1987).
147
568 U.S. 398 (2013).
148
Laird, 408 U.S. at 13–14.
149
Id. at 2.
150
Id. at 13.
151
Id.
152
Id. at 13 & n.7 (stating that plaintiffs based their allegations on “speculative
apprehensiveness that the Army may at some future date misuse the information in some way
that would cause [plaintiffs] direct harm”).
153
Id. at 13–14.
154
See Laird, 408 U.S. at 11 (first citing Baird v. State Bar of Ariz., 401 U.S. 1 (1971);
then citing Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); then citing Lamont v.
Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301 (1965); and then citing Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964))
(“In recent years this Court has found in a number of cases that constitutional violations may
arise from the deterrent, or “chilling,” effect of governmental regulations that fall short of a
direct prohibition against the exercise of First Amendment rights.”); see also id. at 12–13
(“The decisions in these cases fully recognize that governmental action may be subject to
constitutional challenge even though it has only an indirect effect on the exercise of First
Amendment rights.”).
155
See id. at 11 (“In none of these cases, however, did the chilling effect arise merely
146
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precedent, plaintiffs must show that they “ha[ve] sustained, or [are]
immediately in danger of sustaining, a direct injury as the result of [the
relevant government] action.”156 According to the Court, the plaintiffs “d[id]
not meet this test.”157
2. Meese v. Keene
Fifteen years later, the Supreme Court addressed another alleged
“probabilistic” First Amendment injury in Meese v. Keene,158 this time with
a much different result. There, the Court reiterated that plaintiffs may still
establish injury and causation by showing that their speech was chilled by a
law or regulation that does not directly target or infringe upon that speech.159
In Keene, the plaintiff, a lawyer and California state senator, sought to
show films that the Department of Justice (DOJ) had identified as “political
propaganda” under the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938 (the
“Registration Act”).160 The plaintiff sued to enjoin the DOJ from so
designating the films.161
The Court held that the plaintiff established standing to challenge the
DOJ’s application of the Registration Act.162 The Court determined that the
plaintiff had adequately demonstrated both an injury-in-fact and a causal
connection between that injury and the DOJ’s conduct.163 The Court
distinguished Laird.164 It noted that, unlike the plaintiffs in Laird, the
plaintiff in the case before it had “alleged and demonstrated more than a
‘subjective chill.’”165 The plaintiff did not rely on mere allegations that the
DOJ’s designation of the films as “political propaganda” had chilled his
speech by deterring him from showing the films.166 Instead, he alleged and
provided evidence that “if he were to exhibit the films while they bore such
characterization, his personal, political, and professional reputation would
suffer and his ability to obtain re-election and to practice his profession

from the individual’s knowledge that a governmental agency was engaged in certain activities
or from the individual’s concomitant fear that, armed with the fruits of those activities, the
agency might in the future take some other and additionl [sic] action detrimental to that
individual.”).
156
Id. at 13 (quoting Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633, 634 (1937)).
157
Id.
158
481 U.S. 465 (1987).
159
Id. at 472–74.
160
Id. at 467.
161
Id. at 468.
162
Id. at 472–77.
163
See id. at 472–74.
164
Meese, 481 U.S. at 472–74.
165
Id. at 473.
166
Id.
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would be impaired.”167
The Court acknowledged that the DOJ’s designation of the film did not
directly infringe on the plaintiff’s First Amendment rights because it did not
actually prohibit the plaintiff from acquiring or showing the films.168 It
maintained, however, that “[w]hether the statute [itself] in fact constitutes an
abridgement of the plaintiff’s freedom of speech is . . . irrelevant to the
standing analysis.”169
3. Clapper v. Amnesty International USA
More recently, in Clapper v. Amnesty International USA,170 the Court
held that the plaintiffs failed to establish standing because they could not
show that their “threatened injury” was “certainly impending.”171 According
to the Court, “[a]llegations of possible future injury are not sufficient.”172 In
Clapper, a group of attorneys and journalists challenged, on First
Amendment grounds, section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act of 1978 (the “Surveillance Act”),173 which permits the surveillance by
the United States of certain foreign individuals.174 The plaintiffs argued that
the Surveillance Act chilled their speech by causing them to refrain from
communicating with “likely targets of surveillance” with whom their work
“require[d] them to engage in sensitive international communications.”175
According to the plaintiffs, “there w[as] an objectively reasonable likelihood
that their communications [would] be acquired under [the Surveillance
Act] at some point in the future.”176
The Court held that the plaintiffs lacked standing.177 The Court
concluded that the plaintiffs’ allegations of injury “relie[d] on a highly
attenuated chain of possibilities”178 involving “speculation about the
decisions of independent actors.”179 According to the Court, the plaintiffs
could not “manufacture standing merely by inflicting harm on themselves
based on their fears of hypothetical future harm that is not certainly

167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178
179

Id. (quoting Keene v. Smith, 569 F. Supp. 1513, 1515 (E.D. Cal. 1983)).
Id.
Id. at 473 (quoting Keene v. Meese, 619 F. Supp. 1111, 1118 (E.D. Cal. 1985)).
568 U.S. 398 (2013).
Id. at 401, 410.
Id. at 409 (citations omitted).
50 U.S.C. § 1881a (2018).
Clapper, 568 U.S. at 401.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 422.
Id. at 410.
Id. at 414.
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impending.”180
Significantly, although the Court articulated a “requirement that
‘threatened injury must be certainly impending to constitute injury in
fact,’”181 the text of footnote five of the decision suggested a different
standard: the “substantial risk” standard.182 In footnote five, the Court stated:
Our cases do not uniformly require plaintiffs to demonstrate that
it is literally certain that the harms they identify will come about.
In some instances, we have found standing based on a “substantial
risk” that the harm will occur, which may prompt plaintiffs to
reasonably incur costs to mitigate or avoid that harm.183
However, the Court concluded, “to the extent that the ‘substantial risk’
standard is relevant and is distinct from the ‘clearly impending’ requirement,
respondents fall short of even that standard, in light of the attenuated chain
of inferences necessary to find harm here.”184 A year later, in Susan B.
Anthony List v. Driehaus,185 the Court, citing Clapper, stated that “[a]n
allegation of future injury may suffice if the threatened injury is ‘certainly
impending,’ or there is a ‘substantial risk’ that the harm will occur.”186
B. Misapplication of the Supreme Court’s “Probabilistic” First
Amendment Injury Jurisprudence to Compulsory Campus Carry
Law Cases
In Glass, the district court and the Fifth Circuit rigidly applied the
Supreme Court’s “probabilistic” First Amendment injury framework. Both
courts relied on Laird and Clapper.187 In particular, both courts strictly

180

Clapper, 568 U.S. at 416 (citations omitted).
Id. at 410 (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990)).
182
Id. at 414 n.5; see also Bradford C. Mank, Clapper v. Amnesty International: Two or
Three Competing Philosophies of Standing Law?, 81 TENN. L. REV. 211, 230 (2014) (“[T]his
footnote acknowledged that the Court had sometimes used a ‘substantial risk’ test for standing
injury that is arguably different from the ‘certainly impending’ test used by the majority in
the rest of its opinion.”).
183
Clapper, 568 U.S. at 414 n.5 (first citing Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561
U.S. 139, 153–55 (2010); then citing Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 8 (1988); then
citing Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1000–01 (1982); and then citing Babbitt v. United
Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979)).
184
Id. (“In addition, plaintiffs bear the burden of pleading and proving concrete facts
showing that the defendant’s actual action has caused the substantial risk of harm. Plaintiffs
cannot rely on speculation about ‘the unfettered choices made by independent actors not
before the court.’” (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 562 (1992))).
185
573 U.S. 149 (2014).
186
Id. at 158 (emphasis added) (quoting Clapper, 568 U.S. at 409, 414 n.5).
187
See Glass v. Paxton, 900 F.3d 233, 238–42 (5th Cir. 2018); Glass v. Paxton, No. 1:16CV-845-LY, 2017 WL 4506806, at *3 (W.D. Tex. July 6, 2017), aff’d, 900 F.3d 233 (5th Cir.
2018).
181
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applied the “certainly impending” standard from Clapper.188 The Fifth
Circuit, moreover, distinguished Keene.189 Both courts then concluded that
because neither campus carry laws nor university policies that implement
those laws directly prohibit or restrict speech, any injury alleged in such
cases is not “certainly impending,” but is rather a mere “subjective chill”
involving “a chain of contingencies” that requires speculation about the
future conduct of third parties.190 The courts further rejected the notion of a
causal connection between the chilling of classroom speech and compulsory
campus carry laws or university policies implementing those laws,
contending that any such link would necessarily be based on speculation that
armed students would react violently to plaintiff’s speech.191 Therefore,
according to the courts, any attempt at establishing injury-in-fact or
causation in compulsory campus carry law cases must fail under Laird and
Clapper.192
Relying on the Supreme Court’s “probabilistic” First Amendment
injury framework to bar standing in compulsory campus carry cases is
problematic for two reasons. First, after Clapper, uncertainty remains about
the application and “scope” of the “certainly impending” standard.193
Second, the framework is inapplicable to compulsory campus carry cases
because the injury alleged in such cases is not a “probabilistic” injury.
As an initial matter, the courts in Glass failed to acknowledge the
current ambiguity about the scope and applicability of the “certainly
impending standard.”194 The Court’s references in Clapper to both “the
certainly impending” standard and the “substantial risk” standard left some
uncertainty as to which standard it would apply in future cases.195 Its
188
See Glass v. Paxton, 900 F.3d 233, 238–42 (5th Cir. 2018); Glass v. Paxton, No. 1:16CV-845-LY, 2017 WL 4506806, at *2–3 (W.D. Tex. July 6, 2017), aff’d, 900 F.3d 233 (5th
Cir. 2018).
189
See Glass, 900 F.3d at 242 (“Although Keene’s allegation of harm involved the
contingency of individual voter decisions, he nonetheless alleged certainty about voter
decision-making based on supporting affidavits and opinion polling.”).
190
See Glass, 900 F.3d at 238–42; Glass, 2017 WL 4506806, at *3
191
Id.
192
Id.
193
Standing—Challenges to Government Surveillance—Clapper v. Amnesty
International USA, 127 HARV. L. REV. 298, 298 (2013) (noting that Clapper “left the scope
of the ‘certainly impending’ standard unclear”).
194
Id.
195
See Courtney Chin, Note, Standing Still: The Implications of Clapper for
Environmental Plaintiffs’ Constitutional Standing, 40 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 323, 325–36
(2015) (“An important concession in footnote 5 of Clapper also leaves open the possibility
that plaintiffs may demonstrate injury in fact based on a ‘substantial risk’ of harm.”)
(emphasis in original); Mank, supra note 182, at 230 (noting that “footnote [5] acknowledged
that the Court had sometimes used a ‘substantial risk’ test for standing injury that is arguably
different from the ‘certainly impending’ test used by the majority in the rest of its opinion”).
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reference to both standards in Driehaus did not clear things up.196 As some
commentators have noted, it is particularly unclear “whether its approach to
standing was generally applicable to all cases or whether it was more limited
to standing in intelligence-gathering and foreign affairs cases.”197
This ambiguity matters. Depending on the standard applied, courts may
consider different allegations and evidence, and may weigh those allegations
and evidence differently. Andrew C. Sand maintains that under the
“substantial risk” standard, courts should consider “both the likelihood and
magnitude of harm,” while under the “certainly impending” standard, courts
should consider “only the likelihood that a threatened harm would occur.”198
In Sand’s view, determining which standard applies requires determining
whether the injury alleged is one of two different types of “probabilistic
injuries”: (1) a “threatened injury” or (2) a “fear-based injury.”199 Sand
defines “threatened injuries” as “future injuries in which injury to the
plaintiff is anticipated but has not yet occurred,” and “fear-based injuries” as
“present injuries in which the plaintiff suffers actual injury based on fear or
anticipation of a threatened injury.”200
Sand contends that “because fear-based injuries are suffered presently,”
it is inappropriate to analyze them under a standard “based solely on the
likelihood that harm will occur,” like the “certainly impending” standard.201
Instead, they should be analyzed using a standard like the “substantial risk”
standard that also considers the “magnitude of harm.”202 Sand categorizes
“chilling-effect injuries” as “fear-based injuries.”203 Therefore, courts
196

See Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149 (2014) (emphasis added)
(quoting Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409, 414 n.5 (2013)).
197
Mank, supra note 182, at 225; see also Chin, supra note 195, at 344 (stating that
“Justice Alito not only made sure to contextualize the case, but also went out of his way to
specify that the standing analysis was more likely to fail specifically because it arose in the
national security context” and concluding that “[g]iven such extenuating circumstances, as
well as Justice Alito’s carefully worded decision, it is reasonable to believe that this restrictive
view of standing would and should be limited to its context”); Standing—Challenges to
Government Surveillance, supra note 193, at 304 (quoting Clapper, 568 U.S. at 408–09)
(arguing that the inconsistent standards articulated in Clapper along with dicta there noting
that the Court’s “‘standing inquiry has been especially rigorous when reaching the merits
of . . . an action taken by one of the other two branches of the Federal Government,’
particularly in cases challenging decisions of ‘the political branches in the fields of
intelligence gathering and foreign affairs’” suggests that “‘certainly impending’ may only
apply to litigants challenging governmental decisions in foreign affairs or intelligence.”).
198
Sand, supra note 15, at 732.
199
Id. at 713.
200
Id. (citing Brian Calabrese, Note, Fear-Based Standing: Cognizing an Injury-in-Fact,
68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1445, 1455–73 (2011)).
201
Id. at 732.
202
Id.
203
Id. Sand also maintains that the alleged injury in Clapper constituted a “fear-based
injury” because the plaintiffs alleged that they had incurred “costly and burdensome
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should analyze them under the “substantial risk” standard.204 Sand contends
that “[t]he Clapper majority inappropriately blurred the distinction between
future threatened injury and present fear-based injury.”205 In doing so, the
Court applied an inappropriate standard.206
In Glass, the district court and the Fifth Circuit exacerbated this
problem when they rigidly applied the “certainly impending” standard. Both
courts failed to acknowledge footnote five and treated the alleged injury as a
“threatened injury,” looking only at the likelihood of harm, and ignoring the
magnitude of harm already suffered by the professors. However, even if the
plaintiffs had alleged only that students and faculty self-censor because they
are afraid that hypothetical armed students might react violently to their
speech, they would have alleged a “fear-based injury,” and not a “threatened
injury,” because the alleged chill was “presently suffered.”207 Therefore,
under Sand’s proposed methodology, the magnitude of harm the professors
suffered would have been relevant.208
But even if the courts’ interpretation of the “probabilistic” First
Amendment injury framework were correct, a rigid application of that
framework is inappropriate in cases involving First Amendment challenges
to compulsory campus carry laws. The First Amendment injury alleged by
opponents of compulsory campus carry laws is not a “probabilistic” injury.
It is a present chill caused by a present injury.209 The argument against
compulsory carry laws is not based solely on the proposition that faculty and
students self-censor because they are afraid of violent reprisals from armed
students.210 The argument is also based on the proposition that the presence
or perceived presence of lethal weapons in the classroom creates an
atmosphere of intimidation that is so oppressive it chills classroom speech,
independent of the real or hypothetical conduct of third parties.211 Students
measures,” to avoid surveillance. Id. at 732.
204
Sand, supra note 15, at 732.
205
Id. at 731. Sand claims, however, that the Court applied the appropriate standard in
footnote 5. Id. at 732.
206
Id. at 731–32.
207
See Appellants’ Brief, supra note 11, at 34–35.
208
See Sand, supra note 15, at 732.
209
See Appellants’ Brief, supra note 11, at 34–35.
210
See, e.g., Barnes, supra note 3, at 80 (“Whether a student is actually carrying a weapon
in the classroom is not the crux of the issue. The issue is that professors feel compelled to
avoid topics that could incite confrontation now that concealed weapons could be present in
their classrooms.”); see also Reply Brief, supra note 11, at 4; Supplemental Brief, supra note
11, at 14 (“It is not the [professors] (or their students) being shot or having a gun waived in
their face that is the immediate concern in terms of classroom pedagogy and method. It is the
context, both immediate and historical, that affects their conduct of the classroom.”); AAUP
Amicus Brief, supra note 11, at 5, 12, 17.
211
See Barnes, supra note 3; Lewis, Crossfire, supra note 1, at 2117, 2127; Lewis & De
Luna, supra note 3, at 139; Oblinger, supra note 3, at 109; Appellants’ Brief, supra note 11,
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and faculty members are injured as soon as the presence or perceived
presence of firearms creates that environment.212
Furthermore, unlike the plaintiffs in Laird and Clapper, who were
never themselves subject to the regulations they challenged, plaintiffs
challenging compulsory campus carry laws and policies are subject to those
laws and policies whenever they enter a classroom at a public college or
university in a state where such laws have been enacted.213 And they are not
just subject to the laws in an abstract sense; they are physically subject to
them. Indeed, what makes campus carry cases so different from the
“probabilistic harm” cases relied upon by the courts in Glass is the physical
proximity of the plaintiffs to the alleged harm.214 They are literally in the
same room as the deadly weapons that create that atmosphere of fear and
intimidation.
For these reasons, the alleged injury to faculty and students subject to
compulsory carry laws is neither subjective nor speculative. The alleged
injury is an objective one: an “altered educational environment” of fear and
intimidation.215 It does not require speculation about third-party conduct.
Furthermore, that injury is readily traceable to the conduct of state and
university officials.216 State and university officials are responsible for
at 15–16, 27, 34–35; Reply Brief, supra note 11, at 4, 7–8; Supplemental Brief, supra note
11, at 14; AAUP Amicus Brief, supra note 11, at 5–6, 12, 17, 23.
212
See Barnes, supra note 3; Lewis, Crossfire, supra note 1, at 2117, 2127; Lewis & De
Luna, supra note 3, at 139; Oblinger, supra note 3, at 109.
The professors are not asserting that sometime in the future they may
decide that they need to curtail their classroom teaching activities because
of SB 11’s implementation at UT-Austin. Rather, they are asserting that
SB 11’s implementation will affect them presently, leading them to
dampen the kind of intellectual inquiry that they normally engage in with
their students in class. That is, from the beginning of guns-in-theclassroom, academic activities will be adversely affected. The professors
are not subject to the new policy at some ill-defined future date. The
policy is (or was) effective the day classes started in August 2016—and
its effects on them began that day and have continued since.
Appellants’ Brief, supra note 11, at 34–35.
213
See Jennifer L. Bruneau, Comment, Injury-in-Fact in Chilling Effect Challenges to
Public University Speech Codes, 64 CATH. U. L. REV. 975, 1002 (2015) (“[I]n Laird, there
was no evidence that the plaintiff had been subject to government surveillance, but a student
is always subject to the policies of the college or university in which he is enrolled.” (first
citing DeJohn v. Temple Univ., 537 F.3d 301, 312 (3d Cir. 2008); and then citing Lopez v.
Candaele, 630 F.3d 775, 784 (9th Cir. 2010))).
214
See Rachel Bayefsky, Psychological Harm and Constitutional Standing, 81 BROOK.
L. REV. 1555, 1606 (2016) (arguing that in cases where plaintiffs allege standing based on
psychological harm, “[g]eographical proximity to the source of the challenged legal violation
is [a] tool that courts can use to gauge the nexus between the alleged violation and a particular
plaintiff’s experience of psychological harm”).
215
See AAUP Amicus Brief, supra note 11, at 5–6.
216
See id. at 17.
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enacting and implementing campus carry laws and their attendant university
policies. Because those laws and policies create the environment described
above, those laws and policies have caused or contributed to the chilling of
speech in the classroom.217
The framework used by the courts in Glass is inadequate for analyzing
injury and causation in cases involving First Amendment challenges to
compulsory campus carry laws. The hostile speech environment framework
would prove more appropriate.
IV. THE HOSTILE SPEECH ENVIRONMENT
The hostile speech environment framework presents an alternative,
broader view of injury and causation that allows for a more accurate
understanding of the alleged injuries in compulsory campus carry law cases.
This “novel” framework adopts “terminology from Title VII’s ‘hostile work
environment’ framework.”218 To understand how the hostile speech
environment framework applies to campus carry law cases, it is important to
first understand the development of the Title VII hostile work environment
standard.
A. Evolution of the Title VII Hostile Work Environment Framework
The Title VII hostile work environment framework is useful for
analyzing standing in compulsory campus carry law cases because the
framework acknowledges that an individual or institution can injure a
plaintiff through conduct that creates or contributes to an environment that
is psychologically harmful, even when the individual or institution does not
engage in specific acts that directly harm the plaintiff or, in some cases, even
target the plaintiff.219 The framework developed to allow an employee to
recover against an employer where the employee was subject to “a hostile or
217

Id. at 4; see also Supplemental Brief, supra note 11, at 14.
Juhan, supra note 12, at 1579.
219
See, e.g., Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993) (“[E]ven without regard
to . . . tangible effects, the very fact that . . . discriminatory conduct was so severe or pervasive
that it created a work environment abusive to employees because of their race, gender,
religion, or national origin offends Title VII’s broad rule of workplace equality.”); Joanna L.
Grossman, The First Bite Is Free: Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment, 61 U. PITT. L.
REV. 671, 684 (2000) [hereinafter Grossman, First Bite] (“Sexual harassment that does not
result in a tangible employment action is actionable, if at all, under a hostile work environment
theory[,] . . . [which is] based on the notion that unwelcome sexual conduct, if sufficiently
severe or pervasive, violates Title VII because it alters the terms and conditions of
employment on the basis of sex.”); see also Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual
Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683, 1709 (1998) (“The concept of a hostile work environment
was developed out of an awareness that some actions by supervisors or coworkers can create
an atmosphere that undermines ‘the right to participate in the work place on [an] equal
footing,’ even though these actions may not affect any tangible job benefit.”) (quoting King
v. Bd. of Regents, 898 F.2d 533, 537 (7th Cir. 1990))).
218
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abusive work environment,”220 even where the employee could not
demonstrate that the employer’s discriminatory conduct was “directly linked
to the grant or denial of an economic quid pro quo,”221 or that it resulted in
specific instances of “‘economic’ or ‘tangible’ discrimination.”222
From the inception of the hostile work environment framework, its
proponents acknowledged that discriminatory conduct need not be directly
harmful to the plaintiff, or even precisely targeted at the plaintiff, for it to
create or contribute to an abusive environment.223 The first court “to
articulate[] the concept of hostile work environment harassment”224 was the
Fifth Circuit in Rogers v. EEOC.225 In Rogers, a Hispanic employee filed an
employment discrimination claim with the EEOC against the optometry
practice for which she worked.226 In her EEOC charge, the employee alleged
that her employer discriminated against her by, among other things,
discriminating against the practice’s patients based on their ethnicity.227 As
part of its investigation, the EEOC demanded evidence about the employer’s
patients and their applications for services from the practice.228 The United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas denied this demand,
concluding that even if the employer had discriminated against its patients,
the employee had been not “aggrieved” by this conduct, as required by Title
VII.229
The Fifth Circuit reversed.230 In doing so, the court held, in effect, that
even conduct that may not directly discriminate against an employee or even
directly target that employee may nevertheless constitute discrimination if it

220

Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986).
Id. at 65.
The principal substantive distinction between harassment resulting in a
tangible employment action (quid pro quo) and that not so resulting
(hostile environment) is that the latter requires a showing that the
harassment was severe and pervasive, while the former simply requires
evidence that some tangible employment action was taken based on an
employee’s refusal to submit to a supervisor’s sexual advances.
Grossman, First Bite, supra note 219, at 681.
222
See Harris, 510 U.S. at 21; Grossman, First Bite, supra note 219, at 684; see also
Schultz, supra note 219, at 1709.
223
See, e.g., Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 236–41 (5th Cir. 1971), disapproved by
EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54 (1984).
224
Schultz, supra note 219, at 1714.
225
Rogers, 454 F.2d at 238.
226
Id. at 236.
227
Id.
228
Id.
229
Id. at 237 (quoting Rogers v. EEOC, 316 F. Supp. 422, 425 (E.D. Tex. 1970), rev’d,
454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971).
230
Id. at 241.
221
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creates or contributes to a discriminatory environment.231 The court
determined that language in Title VII prohibiting an employer from
discriminating
against
employees
“with
respect
to
[their]
232
. . . terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” was “expansive”
enough to “sweep[] within its protective ambit the practice of creating a
working environment heavily charged with ethnic or racial
discrimination.”233 According to the Fifth Circuit, discrimination against an
employers’ patients or customers “could be so employee demeaning as to
constitute an invidious condition of employment.”234 After Rogers, courts
continued to apply the hostile work environment framework in cases
involving racial, religious, and national origin discrimination.235
As the hostile work environment framework developed, its proponents
continued to distinguish between conduct that directly injures plaintiffs and
conduct that creates or contributes to a psychologically harmful
environment. The term “hostile work environment” was “first coined,”
along with its “underlying analysis,” in 1979 by Catharine MacKinnon,236
who adopted the hostile work environment framework into the sexual
harassment context.237 The following year, when the EEOC first issued its
sexual harassment guidelines, the agency incorporated MacKinnon’s
231

See Rogers, 454 F.2d at 238.
I am simply not willing to hold that a discriminatory atmosphere could
under no set of circumstances ever constitute an unlawful employment
practice. One can readily envision working environments so heavily
polluted with discrimination as to destroy completely the emotional and
psychological stability of minority group workers, and I think Section 703
of Title VII was aimed at the eradication of such noxious practices.

Id.

232

Id. at 238 (quoting 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (West 2018)).
Id.
234
Id. at 240.
235
See, e.g., Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986) (first citing
Firefighters Inst. for Racial Equal. v. City of St. Louis, 549 F.2d 506, 514–15 (8th Cir. 1977);
then citing Gray v. Greyhound Lines, E., 545 F.2d 169, 176 (D.C. Cir. 1976); then citing
Compston v. Borden, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 157 (S.D. Ohio 1976), disapproved by Harrington v.
Vandalia-Butler Bd. of Educ., 585 F.2d 192 (6th Cir. 1978); and then citing Cariddi v. Kan.
City Chiefs Football Club, 568 F.2d 87, 88 (8th Cir. 1977)).
236
See Grossman, First Bite, supra note 219, at 679 (citing CATHARINE A. MACKINNON,
SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 1–23 (1979)).
237
See Anita Bernstein, Treating Sexual Harassment with Respect, 111 HARV. L. REV.
445, 447 n.4 (1997) (citing MACKINNON, supra note 236, at 32 (noting that MacKinnon
divided sexual harassment “into two categories: quid pro quo harassment and hostile or
abusive environment harassment”); Joanna L. Grossman, Moving Forward, Looking Back: A
Retrospective on Sexual Harassment Law, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1029, 1034 n.32 (2015)
[hereinafter Grossman, Moving Forward] (quoting MACKINNON, supra note 236, at 32)
(“MacKinnon distinguished between harassment ‘in which sexual compliance is exchanged,
or proposed to be exchanged, for an employment opportunity,’ and harassment that is a
‘persistent condition of work.’”).
233
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“framework . . . virtually wholesale.”238
In 1986, in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson,239 the Supreme Court
first adopted the hostile work environment framework into its own
jurisprudence.240 There, the Court held for the first time that a sexual
discrimination claim based on a hostile work environment cause of action
“is actionable under Title VII.”241 According to the Court, a plaintiff may
recover under Title VII by establishing that an employer’s discriminatory
conduct “created a hostile or abusive work environment,” as long as the
harassment is “sufficiently severe or pervasive ‘to alter the conditions of [the
victim’s] employment and create an abusive working environment.’”242
In Meritor, a bank employee brought a Title VII sexual harassment
action against her employer.243 The employee alleged that her supervisor at
the bank repeatedly raped and sexually assaulted her, and continuously
subjected her to unwanted sexual advances and acts of sexual coercion and
exhibitionism.244 She further alleged that he harassed other female
employees.245 The district court denied the employee’s claim, concluding
that the employee “was not the victim of sexual harassment [or] sexual
discrimination.”246 The district court based this conclusion on its assumption
238
Grossman, Moving Forward, at 1034 (citing Guidelines on Discrimination Because of
Sex, 45 Fed. Reg. 74,676, 74,677 (EEOC Nov. 10, 1980) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(c)
(1980)). The EEOC guidelines included under its definition of sexual harassment,
“[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical
conduct of a sexual nature,” not only when “submission to such conduct is made either
explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an individual’s employment,” or “submission to
or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the basis for employment decisions
affecting such individual,” but also when “such conduct has the purpose or effect of
unreasonably interfering with an individual’s work performance or creating an intimidating,
hostile, or offensive working environment.” See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a).
239
477 U.S. 57 (1986).
240
See id. at 66–67 (“Since the Guidelines were issued, courts have uniformly held, and
we agree, that a plaintiff may establish a violation of Title VII by proving that discrimination
based on sex has created a hostile or abusive work environment.” (first citing Henson v. City
of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (11th Cir. 1982); then citing Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 254–
55 (4th Cir. 1983); then citing Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 934–44 (D.C. Cir. 1981); and
then citing Zabkowicz v. West Bend Co., 589 F. Supp. 780 (E.D. Wis. 1984)).
241
Id. at 73.
242
Id. at 66–67 (alteration in original).
243
Id. at 60.
244
Id. According to the employee, she initially agreed to have sexual intercourse with
her supervisor “out of what she described as fear of losing her job.” Id. Her supervisor
“thereafter made repeated demands upon her for sexual favors, usually at the branch, both
during and after business hours; she estimated that over the next several years she had
intercourse with him some 40 or 50 times.” Id. Additionally, her supervisor “fondled her in
front of other employees, followed her into the women’s restroom when she went there alone,
exposed himself to her, and even forcibly raped her on several occasions.” Id.
245
Meritor, 477 U.S. at 61.
246
Id. at 61. Although the employee testified that the supervisor “touched and fondled
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that sexual harassment required a tangible economic injury.247
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
reversed the decision of the district court, and the Supreme Court affirmed.248
The Supreme Court concluded that language in Title VII that prohibited
“discrimination with respect to ‘compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges’ of employment” could apply to “purely psychological aspects of
the workplace environment”249 and rejected the proposition that this
language applied only to “‘tangible loss’ of ‘an economic character.’”250
In Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,251 the Supreme Court reaffirmed and
refined the Meritor standard.252 There, the Court held that a hostile work
environment that “would reasonably be perceived, and is perceived, as
hostile or abusive,” is actionable, even if it is not “psychologically
injurious.”253 In Harris, the plaintiff, a former manager of an equipment
rental company, brought a hostile work environment claim against the
company because the company’s president “often insulted her because of her
gender and often made her the target of unwanted sexual innuendos.”254 The
district court ruled that, although it was “a close case,” the president’s
“conduct did not create an abusive environment,” and the Sixth Circuit
affirmed.255 The Supreme Court reversed.256 The Court noted that it granted
cert to “resolve a conflict among the Circuits on whether conduct, to be
other women employees of the bank,” the district court also precluded the employee from
presenting “wholesale evidence of a pattern and practice relating to sexual advances to other
female employees in her case in chief, but advised her that she might well be able to present
such evidence in rebuttal to the defendants’ cases,” which she declined to do. See id. at 60–
61.
247
See id. at 67–68 (noting that “[t]he District Court apparently believed that a claim for
sexual harassment will not lie absent an economic effect on the complainant’s employment”).
248
Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141, 152 (D.C. Cir. 1985), aff’d and remanded sub nom.
Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
249
See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64.
250
Id.
251
510 U.S. 17 (1993).
252
Id. at 21–23.
253
Id. at 22 (citing Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67).
254
Id. at 19. According to the findings of a magistrate judge, the president “told [the
plaintiff] on several occasions, in the presence of other employees, ‘[y]ou’re a woman, what
do you know’ and ‘[w]e need a man as the rental manager.’” Id. On at least one occasion,
“he told her she was ‘a dumb ass woman.’” Id. On another occasion, “in front of others, he
suggested that the two of them ‘go to the Holiday Inn to negotiate [the plaintiff’s] raise.’” Id.
In other instances, he “asked [the plaintiff] and other female employees to get coins from his
front pants pocket,” “threw objects on the ground in front of [the plaintiff] and other women,
and asked them to pick the objects up,” and “made sexual innuendos about [the plaintiff’s]
and other women’s clothing.” Id. Once, moreover, “[w]hile [the plaintiff] was arranging a
deal with [a customer], he asked her, again in front of other employees, ‘[w]hat did you do,
promise the guy . . . some [sex] Saturday night?’” Id.
255
Id. at 20.
256
Id. at 23.
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actionable as ‘abusive work environment’ harassment . . . must ‘seriously
affect [an employee’s] psychological well-being’ or lead the plaintiff to
‘suffe[r] injury.’”257 The Court held that it did not.258 According to the
Court:
Title VII comes into play before the harassing conduct
leads to a nervous breakdown. A discriminatorily abusive
work environment, even one that does not seriously affect
employees’ psychological well-being, can and often will
detract from employees’ job performance, discourage
employees from remaining on the job, or keep them from
advancing in their careers. Moreover, even without regard to
these tangible effects, the very fact that the discriminatory
conduct was so severe or pervasive that it created a work
environment abusive to employees because of their race,
gender, religion, or national origin offends Title VII’s broad
rule of workplace equality.259
The Title VII hostile work environment framework acknowledges that
the conduct of an individual or an institution can result in injury to a plaintiff
by impacting the “purely psychological aspects of the . . . environment” as a
whole,260 even where the individual or the institution may not have directly
and tangibly injured or even targeted the plaintiff.261 By adapting this
framework to a First Amendment context, a hostile speech environment
framework would provide a better means for analyzing First Amendment
challenges to compulsory campus carry laws.
B. From the Hostile Work Environment to the Hostile Speech
Environment
S. Cagle Juhan first proposed the hostile speech environment as a
“novel” cause of action to address what he perceived to be problems with
public universities’ attempts to regulate hate speech and impose respect for
diversity.262 Juhan was concerned that the existing First Amendment free
speech framework was insufficient to address what he considered to be
“pervasive efforts [by university administrators] to alienate, chastise, punish,
257

Harris, 510 U.S. at 20 (alterations in original).
Id. at 22.
259
Id.
260
See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986).
261
See Schultz, supra note 219, at 1714–15 (“[T]he original impetus behind creating the
cause of action was to ensure that the prohibition against discrimination extended to actions
that did not in and of themselves effect a tangible job detriment.”); id. at 1715 (“The cause of
action for hostile work environment harassment, however, was devised precisely to cover
situations that do not affect the plaintiffs’ jobs in any tangible or ultimate sense.”); see also
Grossman, First Bite, supra note 219, at 681.
262
See Juhan, supra note 12, at 1579.
258
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or indoctrinate those who hold or espouse hateful or unpopular views”263
because, in his view, “isolated incidents are often insufficiently severe to
warrant the investment of time and money necessary to advocate for one’s
rights.”264 According to Juhan, the hostile speech environment cause of
action could protect “free speech by ensuring that colleges and universities
cannot inflict a First Amendment death by a thousand cuts.”265
The suggestion that a Title VII hostile work environment framework
should be used to prevent colleges and universities from addressing the
precise type of discriminatory conduct Title VII was meant to address is
perverse on its face and unsound for reasons beyond the scope of this Article.
Nevertheless, the notion that students should be able to challenge laws and
policies that create an environment that itself chills speech is a sound one.
Under the Title VII framework, an employee can establish that an employer’s
conduct was discriminatory by demonstrating that the conduct created an
abusive environment, even where the employer’s conduct did not directly
target or tangibly injure the employee.266 Under the hostile speech
environment framework, a plaintiff could similarly establish that a state or
university officials’ conduct chilled classroom speech by demonstrating that
that conduct created an environment that was itself hostile toward classroom
speech, even if that conduct did not directly target or tangibly267 injure the
plaintiff.268
V. COMPULSORY CAMPUS CARRY LAWS AND THE HOSTILE SPEECH
ENVIRONMENT
A. Defining a Hostile Speech Environment Standard
Juhan proposed the hostile speech environment as a separate cause of
action, and suggested the following three elements:269 (1) the First
Amendment must protect the plaintiff’s speech;270 (2) “state action traceable
263

Id. at 1595.
Id. at 1603.
265
Id.
266
See J.M. Balkin, Free Speech and Hostile Environments, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2295,
2297 (1999) (“Even if individual acts do not constitute a hostile environment separately, they
can be actionable when taken together. The test is whether the conduct, taken as a whole,
would lead to an environment that the employee reasonably perceives as abusive.”);
Grossman, First Bite, supra note 219, at 686 (“[W]here . . . harassment manifests as a
longstanding pattern of conduct, no individual incident need be particularly severe in order
for the environment to be actionable.”).
267
See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016) (recognizing that an
intangible harm can constitute an injury-in-fact for Article III standing purposes).
268
See Juhan, supra note 12, at 1595, 1600–03.
269
Id. at 1600.
270
Id.
264
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to [a state] university must regulate, chill, or suppress the [plaintiff’s]
protected speech”;271 and (3) “the hostility manifested by [the] state
university towards a speaker must be ‘sufficiently severe or pervasive’ as to
reasonably affect the speaker’s speech and create an environment objectively
abusive towards that speech.”272
This Article recommends adopting the hostile speech environment
framework only as a means of analyzing injury and causation in cases
involving First Amendment challenges to compulsory campus carry laws,
and not as a separate cause of action. Nevertheless, the second and third
elements parallel the injury-in-fact and causation elements of the Supreme
Court’s standard for establishing Article III standing.273 Therefore, for
purposes of analyzing standing in cases involving campus carry laws, this
Article suggests focusing on the questions of whether “state action traceable”
to state and university officials was hostile toward classroom speech in a
manner “‘sufficiently severe or pervasive’ as to reasonably affect [that]
speech and create an environment objectively abusive towards that
speech.”274 Furthermore, just as a hostile work environment is actionable if
it can “reasonably be perceived, and is perceived, as hostile or abusive,” 275
so too would a hostile speech environment be actionable if it can “reasonably
be perceived, and is perceived, as” so hostile to speech as to chill that
speech.276
B. Applying the Hostile Speech Environment Framework in
Compulsory Campus Carry Law Cases
The hostile speech environment framework is well-suited to cases in
which plaintiffs raise First Amendment challenges to compulsory campus
carry laws. As an initial matter, when opponents of campus carry laws
contend that the presence, or even potential presence, of firearms in the
classroom itself chills speech,277 they are in essence arguing that laws that
271

Id.
Id. at 1600–01 (first citing Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993); and
then citing Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986)).
273
See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (explaining the Article III
standing requirements).
274
See Juhan, supra note 12, at 1601 (first citing Harris, 510 U.S. at 21; and then citing
Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65, 67).
275
See Harris, 510 U.S. at 22.
276
Id.; see also Siegel, supra note 142, at 922 (arguing that “[t]he standard for testing a
claim of chill [should] be the standard that rules all such claims in our legal system: the
reasonable person test. The trial court would ask whether the challenged governmental action
would chill a reasonable person in the way the plaintiff claims to be chilled”).
277
See Appellants’ Brief, supra note 11, at 15–16, 27, 34–35; Reply Brief, supra note 11,
at 4, 7–8; Supplemental Brief, supra note 11, at 14; AAUP Amicus Brief, supra note 11, at
5–6, 12, 17, 23; Barnes, supra note 3, at 79; Lewis, Crossfire, supra note 1, at 2117, 2127;
272
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permit the presence of firearms in the classroom create an environment so
hostile to speech as to chill that speech. At the heart of these arguments is
the proposition that because firearms have enormous lethal potential, and
because the harm they can cause can be almost instantaneous, they possess
a “unique capacity to arouse fear in some people simply through their
presence,”278 or even through their potential presence.279 Therefore, critics
of compulsory campus carry laws maintain that the knowledge that firearms
may be present in the classroom is sufficient to create an environment in
which students and faculty members are too intimidated to engage in
classroom discussions, especially when those discussions involve
controversial topics.280 As Laura Houser Oblinger has noted, “[e]ven if a
shot is never fired, a gun’s presence can still have the effect of intimidation
or suppression, which would inhibit healthy academic discourse.”281
Opponents of compulsory carry laws argue, in essence, both that the
presence of firearms in the classroom creates an environment that is hostile
to free speech, and that the perception of that environment as hostile to
speech is reasonable. In doing so, they rely on empirical evidence, both
statistical and anecdotal, that supports the proposition that the presence of
firearms in an academic setting creates an environment of intimidation. As
Shaundra K. Lewis has noted, multiple studies indicate “that the majority of
students are uncomfortable with firearms being inside academic buildings,

Lewis & De Luna, supra note 3, at 139; Oblinger, supra note 3, at 109.
278
Wyer, supra note 3, at 1016.
279
See, e.g., AAUP Amicus Brief, supra note 11, at 17–18; Barnes, supra note 3, at 84
(“The potential presence of concealed weapons chills speech within the classroom. If speech
is chilled, scholarship cannot flourish, and academic freedom is infringed.”).
280
See, e.g., Appellants’ Brief, supra note 12, at 16 (“[S]tudies suggest that classmates’
knowledge that a fellow student has a gun in class will impede a professor’s ability to generate
discussion on controversial topics, which is a core teaching function.”); Barnes, supra note 3,
at 79 (“The presence of concealed carry weapons within the classroom directs the content of
the professor’s discourse away from controversial topics that may be contrary to popular
opinion. This aversion to provocative content to preserve the safety of the class impedes the
free inquiry of scholarship, which is exactly what the doctrine of academic freedom was
created to prevent.”); Lewis, Crossfire, supra note 1, at 2112, 2123, 2128–29 (noting that (1)
“students who feel uncomfortable in the presence of firearms may be afraid to freely engage
in debates over controversial issues”; (2) the presence of “[f]irearms may discourage students
from expressing unpopular political perspectives”; (3) “[k]nowing that their classmates may
be carrying pistols may dissuade some students from voicing diverse or unpopular intellectual,
political, or social ideas out of fear that they may be shot by someone with strongly held
opposing views in the heat of an argument.”; and (4) “[k]nowing that students may be carrying
concealed firearms may cause professors to avoid discussing provocative, delicate or political
issues”); Lewis & De Luna, supra note 3, at 139 (“Undoubtedly, knowing that their
classmates, professors, or administrators are ‘packing’ will make students more reluctant to
debate controversial and sensitive topics or to challenge a professor over a grade.”).
281
Oblinger, supra note 3, at 109 (citing Joan H. Miller, Comment, The Second
Amendment Goes to College, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 235, 260 (2011)).
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including classrooms.”282 According to Professor Lewis, “[i]f they are
uncomfortable, they cannot learn in violation of their constitutional
academic freedom.”283
In a 2013 study, a group of health sciences professors surveyed students
from fifteen randomly selected public universities in the Midwest about their
“perceptions and practices regarding carrying concealed handguns on
university campuses.”284 Of the 1,649 students who responded, 79% did not
support allowing concealed carry permit holders to carry firearms on
university grounds.285 A nearly equal percentage felt that allowing concealed
carry on campus would make most students feel unsafe.286
In 2014, another group of health sciences professors, which included
some of those involved in the 2013 study, randomly surveyed “college and
university presidents regarding their support for concealed handguns being
carried on college campuses.”287 Of the 401 college and university
presidents who responded, 95% did not support allowing concealed carry on
campus.288 Moreover, 89% “perceived that most . . . students . . . would feel
unsafe” under such conditions.289 Additionally, in a survey of college faculty
and staff members in Kansas, conducted after the passage of a Kansas State
law permitting concealed firearms on college and university campuses, “82
percent said they would feel less safe if students were allowed to carry
concealed handguns on campus.”290
Opponents of compulsory campus carry laws have also pointed to
multiple documented cases of potential students and faculty members

282

Lewis, Crossfire, supra note 1, at 2128.
Id.
284
See Amy Thompson et al., Student Perceptions and Practices Regarding Carrying
Concealed Handguns on University Campuses, 61 J. AM. C. HEALTH 243, 243–45 (2013); see
also Lewis, Crossfire, supra note 1, at 2128 n.116 (citing Marc Ransford, Study: Most College
and University Presidents Don’t Want Guns on Campus, BALL ST. U. (June 2, 2014),
http://cms.bsu.edu/news/articles/2014/6/study-most-college-and-university-presidents-dontwant-guns-on-campus).
285
Thompson et al., supra note 284, at 247.
286
Id.
287
See James H. Price et al., University Presidents’ Perceptions and Practice Regarding
the Carrying of Concealed Handguns on College Campuses, 62 J. AM. C. HEALTH 461, 461
(2014).
288
Id. at 463; see also Lewis, Crossfire, supra note 1, at 2111 n.4 (citing Price et al., supra
note 287, at 463).
289
Price et al., supra note 287, at 463.
290
Ryan Newton, Survey: Kansas Shows Strong Opposition to Law Allowing Guns on
Campus, KSN.COM (Jan. 14, 2016), https://www.ksn.com/news/local/kansas-shows-strongopposition-to-law-allowing-guns-on-campus/1024162729; see also Wolcott, supra note 3, at
883 n.51 (citing Sam Zeff, Kansas Campuses Prepare for Guns in Classrooms, NPR ED (Mar.
22, 2016), http://www.npr.org/sections/ed/2016/03/22/470717996/kansas-campuses-preparefor-guns-in-classrooms).
283
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avoiding or leaving schools, including highly-ranked schools, at which
firearms are permitted in the classroom.291 Following the passage of Texas’s
compulsory campus carry law, multiple students cited the law as their reason
for rejecting offers from UT.292 In one example, a UT graduate and
prospective law student asserted that he decided not to attend the University
of Texas at Austin Law School, despite a “deep” and “emotional connection”
to the University and the “great value” it offered “in the face of rising law
school tuition across the nation.”293 The student said that he based his
decision in part on Texas’s recently enacted campus carry law.294 In another
example, a prospective graduate student declined an offer to pursue her
masters’ degree at UT because of the university’s Campus Carry policy.295
Both students specifically stated that they would fear speaking openly about
sensitive topics in a classroom where firearms were present.296
Similarly, multiple faculty members or potential faculty members have
left or declined positions at UT following the passage of Texas’s campus
carry law.297 After the law passed, Daniel Hamermesh, a professor emeritus
of economics, announced his withdrawal from his position.298 Similarly,
291

See, e.g., Barnes, supra note 3, at 86; Lewis, Crossfire, supra note 1, at 2128, 2141–
42 nn.115, 203 (first citing Tom Dart, Texas Academics Told to Avoid “Sensitive Topics” if
Gun Law Goes into Effect, GUARDIAN (Feb. 24, 2016), http://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2016/feb/24/university-of-houston-faculty-campus-carry-law-texas-guns; and then
citing Liam Stack, Dean at University of Texas Resigns in Part Over Handgun Law, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 27, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/27/us/dean-at-university-of-texasresigns-in-part-over-handgun-law.html); Lewis & De Luna, supra note 3, at 139–40; see also
AAUP Amicus Brief, supra note 11, at 19 nn.13–14 (first citing Michael Martinez & Don
Melvin, Texas Dean Quits, Partly Over State’s New Campus Gun Law, CNN (Feb. 26, 2016),
https://www.cnn.com/2016/02/26/us/texas-professor-quits-gun-law/index.html; and then
citing Eleanor Dearman & W. Gardner Selby, Professor: “Concrete Examples” of Teachers,
Students Spurning University of Texas Due to Gun Law, POLITIFACT TEX. (Aug. 26, 2016),
https://www.politifact.com/texas/statements/2016/aug/26/lisa-moore/professor-concreteexamples-teachers-students-spur/).
292
See Andrew Wilson, Why I Wouldn’t Go to the University of Texas Law School,
NATION (May 5, 2016), http://www.thenation.com/article/why-i-wouldnt-go-to-theuniversity-of-texas-law-school; Lewis, Crossfire, supra note 1, at 2128 n.115; Dart, supra
note 291; Dearman & Selby, supra note 291.
293
See Wilson, supra note 292.
294
Id.
295
See Dart, supra note 291; see also Lewis, Crossfire, supra note 1, at 2128 n.115.
296
See Dart, supra note 291 (quoting graduate student who declined admission to UT as
stating, “If I know a person could have a gun in class I’m not so interested in speaking
openly”); Wilson, supra note 292 (noting that law students “must grapple with the stress of
grades and careers, but also with topics like abortion and marriage equality, adding fuel to the
fire,” and asserting, “[t]he potential for offense in legal classrooms is high, and adding guns
in the mix is dangerous”).
297
See, e.g., Lewis, Crossfire, supra note 1, at 2128, 2141–42 nn.115, 203; Lewis & De
Luna, supra note 3, at 139–40; Dart, supra note 291; Dearman & Selby, supra note 291;
Martinez & Melvin, supra note 291; see also AAUP Amicus Brief, supra note 11, at 19 n.13.
298
Samantha Ketterer, Citing Concerns with Campus Carry, Professor Emeritus to
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Frederick Steiner, the Dean of UT’s School of Architecture, stated that
Texas’s campus carry law “was ‘a factor’ in his decision to leave [UT].”299
Both Hamermesh and Steiner found the proposition of guns in the classroom
intimidating.300 Another UT professor stated that she “personally [knew] of
at least two cases of senior faculty hires in which a top candidate withdrew
[one from Harvard, one from the University of Virginia], citing concern over
[Texas’s campus carry laws].”301 In an open letter to UT, moreover,
sociologist Harry Edwards “rescind[ed] all association and affiliation with
[a] lecture forum [at UT] named in [his] honor.”302 Other potential faculty
members have declined teaching or speaking positions at UT because of
Texas’s campus carry law.303
Opponents of campus carry laws have also pointed to evidence of selfcensoring on the part of faculty because of the presence of firearms on
campus.304 After Texas enacted its campus carry law, the faculty senate at
the University of Houston warned faculty members in a slideshow that they
“may want to be careful discussing sensitive topics; drop certain topics from
[their] curriculum; not ‘go there’ if [they] sense anger; limit student access
off hours; go to appointment-only office hours; [and] only meet ‘that student’
in controlled circumstances.”305
Under a hostile speech environment framework, evidence that some
students or faculty members may not feel intimated by the presence or
perceived presence of firearms would not establish the absence of a hostile
speech environment any more than evidence that some employees are not
offended by an employer’s discriminatory conduct would establish the
absence of a hostile work environment. The question is whether such fear is
Withdraw from University, DAILY TEXAN (Oct. 7, 2015), http://www.dailytexanonline.com/
2015/10/07/citing-concerns-with-campus-carry-professor-emeritus-to-withdraw; see also
Lewis, Crossfire, supra note 1, at 2111 n.7.
299
Martinez & Melvin, supra note 291.
300
According to Hamermesh, “With a huge group of students, my perception is that the
risk that a disgruntled student might bring a gun into the classroom and start shooting at me
has been substantially enhanced by the concealed-carry law.” Ketterer, supra note 298.
Steiner stated, “When you have a stressful situation like exams, performance review or studio,
I don’t see how a firearm can enhance that learning experience[.]” Martinez & Melvin, supra
note 291. According to Steiner, “[t]here’s no shortage of examples of stressful work settings
that result in people being shot. It’s not abstract. We see it all the time. So why add firearms
to a situation where we know there is stress involved.” Id.
301
Dart, supra note 291.
302
Harry Edwards, A Letter to the University of Texas About Campus Concealed Carry,
HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 25, 2016), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/a-letter-to-theuniversity-of-texas-about-campus-concealed-carry_us_57bf596ce4b04193420e57e6.
303
See Dearman & Selby, supra note 291; see also AAUP Amicus Brief, supra note 11,
at 19.
304
See Lewis, Crossfire, supra note 1, at 2123.
305
Dart, supra note 291; see also Lewis, Crossfire, supra note 1, at 2123.
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reasonable.306 As Laura Houser Oblinger has noted, moreover, “[i]f even
one person in each classroom felt uncomfortable by the presence of guns,
that one person is prevented from freely and comfortably participating in
classroom and campus debates, thereby contravening the purpose of higher
education.”307
Based on the above, opponents of the campus carry laws could use the
hostile speech environment framework to demonstrate that the presence or
perceived presence of firearms in classrooms creates an environment that is
severely and pervasively hostile toward speech, and that state and university
officials create such an environment by enacting and implementing
compulsory campus carry laws and policies. Therefore, if that environment
leads students or faculty members to self-censor, those officials have caused
the chilling of their speech.
VI. CONCLUSION
Rigid application of the Supreme Court’s current framework for cases
involving fear-based First Amendment injuries present a roadblock to
students and faculty members seeking to challenge compulsory campus carry
laws on First Amendment grounds. It should not, however, be a permanent
barrier. The hostile speech environment framework offers a way forward.

306
307

See supra Part V.A.
Oblinger, supra note 3, at 109.

